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DISCOVERY PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-FRIEND OR FOE?
Under Rule 2 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 a
party may take the testimony of any person by deposition upon
oral examination.2 Except for the provision in Rule 26(a) whereby
a plaintiff may not serve notice of taking a deposition within 20
days of the commencement of the action without leave of court,
the Rules are silent as to the order in which depositions are to be
taken. The courts, however, have developed a rule of priority
giving one party the right to complete his depositions before his
adversary may begin to take depositions. This Comment will
analyze the court-developed rule of priority and its various ju-
dicial applications.
Many lawyers feel that gaining a discovery priority results
in a substantial tactical advantage. This belief often results in a
race between lawyers to gain priority. It has been argued that
knowledge of the adversary's version of the facts will assist an
attorney in preparing his client and witnesses for examination.3
Also, since it has often been held that the party who obtains the
discovery priority may complete all of his depositions before his
adversary may begin discovery, 4 a prolonged series of depositions
taken by the party with priority could effectively delay an action
for an inordinate period of time. This Comment will attempt to
determine whether the tactical advantages of gaining priority are a
result of the court-developed priority rule itself, or only the mis-
application of the priority rule by the courts.
The party who first serves proper notice for the taking of depo-
sitions under Rule 26(a) obtains priority to take those depositions
1. Hereinafter all references to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in the text will be represented as "Rule."
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) provides:
WHEN DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN. Any party may take the tes-
timony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discov-
ery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.
After commencement of the action the deposition may be taken
without leave of court, except that leave, granted with or without
notice, must be obtained if notice of the taking is served by the
plaintiff within 20 days after commencement of the action.
3. Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
4. E.g., E.I. DuPont DeNemours and Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
23 F.R.D. 237 (D.C. Del. 1959); Fox v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12
F.R.D. 202 (D.C. Del. 1951).
noticed., No judicial reasoning can be found to support this rule.
Most likely the courts felt that a discovery priority should be
established in every case and decided the simplest solution to the
problem was to give priority to the party first requesting to take
depositions. It is important to note that the rule of priority was
developed only to determine the order in which depositions under
Rule 26 will be taken. The rule was not intended to determine the
order of other discovery procedures.6
The award of priority is not affected by the date scheduled
for the deposition in the notice for the taking of the deposition.
7
Thus if the defendant serves notice on January 1 to take a depo-
sition scheduled for Feburary 1, and the plaintiff serves notice on
January 5 to take a deposition scheduled for January 15, the de-
fendant, by first serving notice for examination, obtains priority.
This reasoning seems sound. A party should not be able to ob-
tain priority by waiting until his adversary notices the taking of
a deposition and then scheduling a deposition prior to the date
selected by his adversary. This interpretation also prevents a party
from being pressured into scheduling a deposition before he is
adequately prepared to take it. The rule could be abused by an
attorney by giving first notice for a deposition scheduled far in
the future. However, a court, under the authority given it by
Rule 30(b),8 could control such abuse by issuing an order to take
the deposition prior to the scheduled date.
5. See, e.g., Auburn Capitol Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres,
83 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y.
1930); Grauer v. Schenley Products Co., 26 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
Rifkin v. United States Lines, 24 F.R.D. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Reading-
Sinram-Streat-Coals v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 21 F.R.D. 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Isbrandsten v. Moller, 7 F.R.D. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Gins-
burg v. Railway Express Agency, 6 F.R.D. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Shamo-
kin Woolen Mills, Inc. v. Cortille Fabrics, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
2A W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 643 (Rules
ed. 1958); 4 J. Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.13 (2d ed. 1969).
6. See, e.g., Forstman Woolen Co. v. Manufacturers Retail Men's
Stores, 6 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Shamokin Woolen Mills, Inc. v. Cor-
tille Fabrics, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
7. Independent Productions Corp. v. Loews, 148 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957); Mutual Finance Corp. v. Sobol, 7 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b) provides:
ORDERS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PARTIES AND DEPONENTS. After notice
is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined
and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not
be taken, or that it may be taken only at some designated place
other than that stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only
on written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be in-
quired into, or that the scope of the examination shall be limited
to certain matters, or that the examination shall be held with no
one present except the parties to the action and their officers or
counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened
only by order of the court, or that secret processes, developments,
or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simulta-
neously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
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Not every notice for the taking of depositions will establish
priority. The notice must satisfy the requirements of Rule 30(a).9
Thus a notice which does not designate the examinee with suffi-
cient particularity will not establish priority.10 The priority rule,
when properly applied, gives a party priority only for those depo-
sitions listed in the notice." It is therefore important to deter-
mine quickly and accurately the identity of those persons to be
examined. The notice must be served within a reasonable time be-
fore the scheduled date for the examination. If mailed, the court
will determine whether the notice should have been received by
the adversary a reasonable time before the date scheduled in the
notice for the examination.12 Obviously this rule would lead to
unfair results if the mailed notice were never received. However,
if the notice was not received, a court could delay the examina-
tion under Rule 30(b). 13 A notice must be served to be effective.
Simply filing a notice with the court will not establish priority, 4
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may
make any other order which justice requires to protect the party
or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
9. FED. R. CIrv. P. 30(a) provides:
NoTIcE OF EXAMINATION: TIME AND PLACE. A party desiring to
take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give
reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The
notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and
the name and address of each person to be examined, if known,
and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs.
On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court
may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.
10. Fitzmaurice v. Calman Steamship Corp., 26 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Pa.
1960); Budget Dress Corp. v. Joint Board of Dress and Waistmakers' Union
of Greater New York, 24 F.R.D. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Park and Tilford
Distillers Corp. v. The Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
11. See, e.g., Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
21 F.R.D. 290 (D.C. Mass. 1957); Court Degraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loews,
Inc., 20 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
12. Stover v. Universal Moulded Products Corp., 11 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.
Pa. 1950) (two days were deemed insufficient notice).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. Porto Transport v. Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp., 21 F.R.D.
251 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (plaintiff's argument that under Rule 6(e) a notice
is not effective until 3 days after mailing was unsuccessful because the
court decided that Rule 5(b) is controlling); FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) :
ADDITIONAL TIME AFTER SERVICE BY MAIL. Whenever a party has
the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings
within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
FED. R. Crv. P. 5(b):
SERVIcE:: How MADE. Whenever under these rules service is re-
quired or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an
however, a mailed notice is deemed effective upon mailing.15 The
requirement of notice is to enable the examinee to prepare for the
examination; it is the examinee who needs notice, not the court.
A mailed notice will most likely soon reach the examinee. A
notice filed with a court might never reach the examinee. Serving
interrogatories upon the adversary will not operate as notice for
the taking of depositions. Since under Rule 33 a plaintiff may
serve interrogatories without leave of the court 10 days after com-
mencement of the action, it has been reasoned that to enable serv-
ice of interrogatories to establish the priority for depositions would
lessen the protection afforded the defendant under Rule 26(a).16
A motion to examine the adversary is not a substitute for serving
notice to take depositions because a motion to examine does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 30(a) .17 One court has held
that informal notice to take a deposition is sufficient to establish
priority if informal notice is an accepted practice in the jurisdic-
tion."' Story v. Quarterback Sports Federation, Inc., a more recent
decision, held that a telephoned agreement between attorneys to
take a deposition did not establish priority since informal notice
was not the established practice in the jurisdiction. 9 It would
seem preferable to allow attorneys to determine the order of
depositions without court intervention. This practice could be en-
couraged by permitting attorneys to rely on informal notice. After
the Story decision, there seems little chance for the development
of the practice of informal notice.
Most courts agree that the purpose of the rule prohibiting a
attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him
or by mailing it to him at his last known address or, if no address
is known, by leaving it with the clerk of court. Delivery of a copy
within this rule means: handing it to the attorney or to the party;
or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge
thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous
place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served
has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then resid-
ing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.
15. Wendkos v. ABC Consolidated Corp., 38 F.R.D. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
16. Dow Chemical Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 26 F.R.D. 179 (D.C.
Del. 1960) (this court apparently felt that the purpose of the 20 day delay
is to afford the defendant sufficient time to gain priority); FED. R. CIv. P.
33:
... Interrogatories may be served after commencement of the ac-
tion and without leave of court, except that, if service is made by
the plaintiff within 10 days after such commencement, leave of
court granted with or without notice must first be obtained. ...
17. Forstman Woolen Co. v. Manufacturers Retail Men's Stores, 6
F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), see note 9 supra.
18. Warning Lites Co. v. S.H. Leggitt, 32 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Tex. 1963)
(a telephoned agreement between attorneys to take a deposition was held
to establish priority).




plaintiff from serving notice for depositions until 20 days after
commencement of the action without leave of court is to enable
defendant to examine the complaint and secure an attorney be-
fore submitting to an examination. 20 In effect, however, this rule,
coupled with the general rule of priority, enables the defendant
to gain priority in the Vast majority of cases. One decision has
supported this result. 1
In fact, as a general rule, it would be preferable that the
defendant be afforded the first right to take the depo-
sition of the plaintiff. Under the present federal rules a
plaintiff may serve a vague and general complaint, and the
defendant should have an opportunity early in the pro-
ceedings to find out the real basis upon which the plain-
tiff is proceeding, which can only be done by the depo-
sition and discovery procedure, since bills of particular are
seldom, if ever, granted by the federal courts.
22
Another court felt that if the intent of the rule was to enable
defendants to gain priority, such intent would have appeared in
either Rule 26(a) or its official comments.28 A textual authority
has concurred with the latter reasoning.2 ' In his work Moore
points out that in 1955 the advisory committee to the Federal
Rules proposed an amendment to Rule 30(a) which would give the
courts discretion to regulate priority ". . . as shall best serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and interests of justice.' ' 25
Although the amendment was not adopted, Moore reasons that its
proposal indicates that the advisory committee did not feel that
priority should be determined by a mechanical rule which would
generally enable defendants to gain priority.
The determination of the commencement of the 20 day pe-
riod has often resulted in litigation. In Edwin H. Morris & Co.
v. Warner Brothers Pictures26 the complaint was filed on March 2
and served on the three defendants on March 6, 9 and 17. Plain-
tiff's service of notice on March 24 was held to establish priority
20. Edwin H. Morris and Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 10 F.R.D. 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
21. Reading-Sinram-Streat-Coals v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 21
F.R.D. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
22. Id. at 334.
23. Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F.R.D. 432
(D.C.N.Y. 1949); Cf. Dow Chemical Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 26 F.R.D.
179 (D.C. Del. 1960).
24. 4 J. MOoRE, FE ERAL PRACTiCx § 26.13 (2d ed. 1969).
25. Id. at 1154.
26. Edwin H, Morris and Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 10 F.R.D. 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
since the action was deemed to commence on the filing of the
complaint.
The 20 day delay required before the plaintiff may notice
the taking of the defendants' deposition is to give the de-
fendant time to examine the complaint and secure an attor-
ney. It does not follow that the running of the 20 day
period should not start until the complaint is served on
the defendant, because if that were the rule, administra-
tive difficulties would ensue, especially in cases like this
where there are many defendants and the complaint was
served on each a different day. By selecting the date of
the filing of the complaint, a readily discernable and easily
administered point in time was fixed.
2 7
In Schilling-Hiller S.A. Industrial E. Commercial v. Virginia-
Carolina Chemical Corp.,8 the action was commenced in a state
court and four days later was removed to a federal court. Twenty-
one days after the action was commenced in the state court, the
plaintiff served notice for the taking of depositions. Thus the
defendant had 20 days to obtain an attorney and only 16 days to
inform himself of the true nature of the action. Nevertheless, the
court strictly construed Rule 26(a). Since plaintiff's notice was
given more than 20 days after the action commenced, it was not
premature. The reasoning of these two cases seems unsound. If
the purpose of the 20 day delay is to give the defendant opportun-
ity to secure an attorney and examine the complaint before plain-
tiff may serve his notice, then the 20 days should commence after
the defendant receives notice of the action. A defendant ordinarily
learns of an action only upon service of the complaint. The courts
seem to have ignored completely the purpose of the rule in an
attempt to avoid possible administrative difficulties. In another
action the summons and complaint were not served on defendant
until 18 days after the complaint was filed.29 Twenty-one days
after the complaint was filed, plaintiff, contending that under Rule
3 an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,
served notice of taking depositions."0 The court, viewing the Rules
as an integrated whole rather than as isolated fragments, ruled
that Rule 26(a), together with Rule 4(a),31 contemplates prompt
service of the complaint. The court, although conceding that there
is no fixed time for delivery of the complaint, held that a flagrant
27. Id. at 237.
28. Schilling-Hillier SA Industrial E Commercial v. Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Corp., 19 F.R.D. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
29. Caribbean Const. Corp. v. Kennedy Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Corp.,
13 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 provides: COMMENCEMENT OF AcTioN. A civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.
31. FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(a) provides: SUMMONS: ISSUANCE. Upon the
filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and de-
liver it for service to the marshall or to a person specially appointed to
serve it. Upon request of the plaintiff separate or additional summons
shall issue against any defendants.
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violation of one Rule could not be used to circumvent another
Rule.
A court may grant the plaintiff leave to notice the taking of
depositions within 20 days of the commencement of the action. 2
To obtain the permission, the plaintiff must clearly show that he
will be severely prejudiced if forced to wait 20 days to begin his
discovery.83 Neither the desire to obtain priority nor an allegation
that the defendant might gain priority in order to unduly delay
the action8 4 is sufficient to obtain the leave of court to serve notice
for depositions within 20 days of the commencement of the action.
A court can prevent undue delay under Rule 30(d).31 An allega-
tion that the examinee is about to leave the jurisdiction for a long
period or permanently, or that the examinee is infirm and may
not live 20 days will, however, usually be sufficient reason to serve
notice for depositions within 20 days of the commencement of the
action.8 6 Thus, if there are no extraordinary circumstances, the 20
day rule will be strictly enforced8T Since, however, the purpose
of the 20 day rule is generally considered to enable the defendant
to obtain an attorney and acquaint himself with the complaint, it
is suggested that once the plaintiff can demonstrate that the pur-
pose of this rule has been accomplished, there is no need for further
requiring him to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances in order
to obtain leave to serve notice of depositions within 20 days of the
32. See, e.g., Suplee, Yeatman, Mosley Co. v. Shapiro, 42 F.R.D. 34
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
33. Babolia v. Local 456, 11 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
34. Id.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) provides:
MOTION TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT EXAMINATION. At any time during
-the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the
deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being con-
ducted in bad faith or in such manner as is unreasonable to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the
action is pending or the court in the district where the deposition
is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to
cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope
and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in subdivi-
sion (b). If the order made terminates the examination, it shall
be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the court in which
the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or
deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the
time necessary to make a motion for an order. In granting or
refusing such order the court may impose upon either party or
upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as
the court may deem reasonable.
36. Morrison Export Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Babolia v. Local 456, 11 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37. See, e.g., Suplee, Yeatman, Mosley Co. v. Shapiro, 42 F.R.D. 34
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
commencement of the action. In any case, the decision of whether
or not to grant the plaintiff leave to serve such notice within 20
days will not affect the determination of priority. 88
The general rule for priority has not been invariably enforced.
In fact, some courts have felt that the rule of priority does more
harm than good.39
[T]he rule of "first come-first served" has converted what
was intended as an orderly process for the preparation for
trial into a game of strategy and a jockeying for position.
The problem of adequate preparation for trial seems to
have been relegated to a subordinate position. . . . The
slight advantage which defendants enjoy because their
notice may be served at anytime after the commencement
of the action should not be turned to the plaintiff's com-
plete disadvantage. It would verily turn the procedural
process into a sporting theory of justice and a battle of
wits between opposing counsel.
40
Instead of awarding one party priority, these courts developed
systems of alternating discovery periods for each party. These
courts did not, however, completely abandon the general rule of
priority since they ruled that the party who first served notice to
take depositions could take the first of the alternating depositions.
In most cases only the most compelling reasons have persuaded
the courts to deviate from the priority rule.4 1 Neither the mere
desire to obtain priority nor an allegation of the necessity to
promptly examine the adversary to secure admissions and other
evidence to support an urgent motion for a preliminary injunction
will justify a departure from the priority rule.42  An allegation
that an examination might result in a harassing inquiry into facts
not within the personal knowledge of the examinee will not affect
a court's adherence to the priority rule because relief from
harassment can be obtained under Rule 30(d).4 In Kaeppler v.
Jas. H. Mathews and Co.,4 4 one plaintiff was also involved in an
38. See, e.g., K.J. Schwartzbaum, Inc. v. Evans, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Prinias v. Andreadis, 12 F.R.D. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Bar-
gen Toy & Novelty Co. v. Hhalad, 11 F.R.D. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
39 See, e.g., International Commodities Corp. v. International Ore &
Fertilizer Corp., 30 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
40. Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D.
156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
41. See, e.g., Story v. Quarterback Sports Fed'n., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 432
(D.C. Minn. 1969); Prodear v. Robin Int'l. Cinerama Corp., 32 F.R.D. 434
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Hillside Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2 F.R.D.
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
42. Buren v. Schein, 24 F.R.D. 504 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Baker v. Midtown
Bus Terminal, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 70 (D.C.N.Y. 1942) See also Modigliani Glass
Fibres Inc. v. Glasfloss Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 647 (E.D.N.Y 1948) (an arrange-
ment of the schedules of an associate counsel and a stenographer to attend
the taking of a deposition was held not to affect priority).
43. See note 35 supra.
44. 200 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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action for tax evasion. It was argued that the government could
claim that a consent by the plaintiff to an examination in this civil
action would operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination of the tax evasion action. The court modified the
defendant's discovery priority by ordering that this plaintiff could
not be examined until the defendant completed the remainder of
his discovery.
Courts once felt that the order of all depositions, including
those concerning jurisdiction and venue, should be determined by
the priority rule. 45  More recent decisions seem to exclude depo-
sitions concerning jurisdiction and venue from the priority rule,
but some of these decisions have limited the exclusion to only
those depositions entirely devoted to jurisdiction and venue.46
This seems proper. Why waste the court's time and the parties'
money by proceeding with an involved discovery procedure if
there is no proper jurisdiction? The requirement that these depo-
sitions concern only jurisdiction and venue might occasionally re-
sult in a party having to examine a person twice, but to hold other-
wise would encourage fabricated objections to jurisdiction.
Once established, the scope of the priority must be deter-
mined. At one time the party who obtained priority was per-
mitted to complete all the depositions listed in his notice before
his adversary could begin any discovery.47 Thus, when one party
obtained the right to first take depositions, the other party could
not submit even interrogatories until the depositions were com-
pleted. Obviously, the tactical advantages resulting from obtaining
priority under these decisions were substantial. Knowledge of an
adversary's version of the facts could greatly assist an attorney in
preparing his client and witnesses for their participation in the
adversary's discovery. If, however, the party with priority un-
duly prolonged his discovery, the adversary could obtain relief
under Rule 30 (d).48
The rule that depositions will be taken in the order de-
manded yields when the reason for the rule disappears.
45. Modigliani Glass Fibres Inc. v. Glasfloss Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 647
(E.D.N.Y. 1948).
46. Deep South Oil Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Park and Tilford Distillers Corp. v. The Distillers Co., 19
F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
47. E.I. DuPont DeNemours and Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23
F.R.D. 237 (D.C. Del. 1959); Fox v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D.
202 (D.C. Del. 1951). An example of how lenient a court may be is found
in Shulman v. Shertz, 18 F.R.D. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
48. See note 35 supra.
Priority obtained solely by reason of fleetfootedness to be
- retained must be supported by reasonable alacrity in con-
ducting the proceedings.
49
The more recent decisions have held the scope of priority not
to extend to the entire discovery process.5 0
To hold in a simple damage suit that the defendant, who
has an advantage under Rule 26 in initiating discovery by
depositions on oral or written interrogatories, should be
permitted to complete all discovery before answering
written interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff under
Rule 33, would frustrate the Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
This seems to be the better view. There is no reason why the
priority rule should apply to discovery other than by depositions.
The fact that one party has gained the right to take depositions
first should not prevent his adversary from seeking information
with interrogatories under Rule 33, notices for production under
Rule 34 or admissions under Rule 36.52 Since these forms of dis-
covery involve parties only, there is no reason why both parties
could not simultaneously use them.
CONCLUSION
Under the general rule of discovery priority, not only must
attorneys race to gain notice, but the determination of priority
based on this race often results in injustice. Perhaps alternatives
to the present priority rule could be suggested to eliminate the
injustice. Priority could be awarded to the party carrying the
burden of proof or to the party without personal knowledge of the
facts attempted to be discovered. Perhaps there are too many
variables in the discovery process to support any general rule of
priority. However, the present priority rule should not be dis-
carded until it is determined whether the rule itself or only the
application of the rule by the courts is inadequate.
Some rule must determine the order of taking depositions.
Even those decisions which purport to substitute a system of
alternating depositions must determine which party may take the
first deposition. The purpose of the Rules is to secure the just,
49. Kurt M. Jackman Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 17 F.R.D. 263,
265 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). "Diligence, as well as priority, is needed if one is to
stay his opponent from proceeding with depositions or interrogatories."
Kurt M- Jackman Co. v. Marine Office of America, 16 F.R.D. 381, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
50. See, e.g., Struthers Scientific and Int'l. Corp. v. General Foods
Corp., 290 F. Supp. 122 (S.D. Tex. 1968); United States v. Time, Inc.,
31 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 21 F.R.D. 290 (D.C. Mass. 1957); Court Degraw Theatre, Inc.
v. Loews, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
51. Sturdevant v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 32 F.R.D. 466, 468 (W.D. Mo.
1963).
52. Dow Chemical Co. v.- Stauffer Chemical Co., 26 F.R.D. 179 (D.C.
D e l . 1 9 6 0 . : . . .. -
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speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 3 This
purpose would be thwarted if the parties in every action were
forced to wait for a judicial determination of the discovery order.
The present priority rule awards priority to the party who
first notices the taking of a deposition. This rule, by itself, can
cause no serious injustice. It has often been argued that the
priority rule, together with the 20 day rule, is unduly harsh on the
plaintiff. However a defendant must be afforded time to obtain
an attorney and acquaint himself with the action. Once this pur-
pose has been accomplished, if the plaintiff would be prejudiced
by a further delay in serving his notice for depositions, failure to
obtain leave of court to immediately serve his notice would clearly
result from the court's improper application of the rule, and not
from the rule itself.
The priority rule was developed only to determine the order
in which depositions are to be taken. There is no need for a
priority rule covering other methods of discovery since discovery,
other than by depositions, can be accomplished simultaneously
by both parties. Therefore, the party without priority should not
be prevented from discovering, other than by depositions, while
the party with priority is completing the depositions which he
noticed, and an attempt to so prevent such discovery is a mis-
application of the priority rule.
Once a party obtains priority under the rule, he could feasibly
prolong his depositions in an attempt to unduly delay the pro-
ceeding. This abuse of priority can easily be restrained under
Rule 30(d), and failure to restrain it would be a misapplication
of the priority rule.
In cases requiring lengthy depositions, a system of alternating
depositions would be a wise solution. However, the solution of
alternating depositions is not really an alternative to the general
priority rule. The determination of the party to first take a depo-
sition could be made under the priority rule, and the order to
alternate the depositions could be made under Rule 30(b).54
It is the belief that gaining discovery priority will result in a
tactical advantage which causes the race to first give notice for
depositions. It is submitted that any tactical advantage is a result
of only the misapplications of the priority rule discussed above.
'"herefore the elimination of these misapplications will be the
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 1: "[The Rules] shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
54. See note 8 supra.
elimination of the race to serve first notice. More importantly, the
correct application of the priority rule will encourage attorneys
to determine the order of discovery with no judicial supervision.
ROBERT H. DUNLAP
